Federica Fazio (Dublin City University)

The 2024 Washington Summit marked a significant milestone in the history of NATO, the most successful and longest-lasting alliance. Seventy-five years after twelve nations from Europe and North America came together in Washington, DC, to sign the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and commit to collective defence, heads of state and government of the now thirty-two-nation-strong NATO gathered again in the US capital to celebrate achievements and make important decisions about the future of this crucial transatlantic alliance.

The Summit¡¯s agenda revolved around three main issues: 1) Supporting Ukraine and its future in the Alliance; 2) Strengthening NATO¡¯s deterrence and defence posture; and 3) Advancing NATO¡¯s global partnerships, particularly with the EU and the Indo-Pacific region. The Alliance made substantial progress on points 2 and 3 but not enough on 1.

No changes in the Defense Investment Pledge were made, despite it reaching its decade-long deadline. Since committing to spending 2% of their GDP on defence in 2014, 23 NATO Allies now hit or exceed that target. The declaration simply noted that "expenditure beyond the 2% of GDP will be needed¡±, as stated in last year's communiqu¨¦. Although progress on the DDA family of plans approved in Vilnius last year is classified, at the NATO Public Forum, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Christopher Cavoli, stated that Allies are quite far along in resourcing the plans. Gaps in specific places, such as enablement and logisitcs, remain, but NATO is working to increase these capabilities through its defence planning process (NDPP). The Alliance also announced the adoption of an Action Plan for the South, NATO¡¯s first-ever southern flank strategy, to reinforce security and stability in the southern neighbourhood and better address security threats from the MENA region, including terrorism defined by the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept as "the most direct asymmetric threat" to allied security.

There is also increased awareness that Europe and the Indo-Pacific, once considered separate theatres, are becoming increasingly interconnected. The Washington Summit was the third summit in a row in which NATO's four Asia-Pacific partners (AP4) - Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea - participated and the first to produce a joint document with them. Allies agreed on flagship projects on technology and support for Ukraine. There is a growing perception that what is happening in Europe today could be happening in East Asia tomorrow. The intensification of the Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership seeking to undermine the rules-based international order is seen as a cause for rising concern. Russia remains ¡°the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security," and China is identified as a ¡°decisive enabler¡± of Russia¡¯s war of aggression against Ukraine in the Summit declaration. China is warned that it cannot continue to fuel ¡°the largest war in Europe in recent history¡± and expect that its interests and relationships with the West remain unchanged.

Allies are also conducting joint exercises and increasing information exchange with Indo-Pacific partners and working to ramp up defence industrial production and cooperation with them as well as with the EU. The new NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge announced at the Summit allows for stronger defence industrial cooperation with the EU, which launched its first-ever Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) in March.

On Ukraine, however, the Alliance achieved some bittersweet accomplishments. The Washington Summit was meant to be a celebration of NATO¡¯s successful open-door policy, reaffirmed in the Summit declaration. The Summit was the first attended by NATO¡¯s newest member, Sweden, after joining the Alliance in March. Following Russia¡¯s invasion of Ukraine, Sweden relinquished its long-standing tradition of neutrality and applied for NATO membership together with Finland, which joined the Alliance last year.

"NATO enlargement unified Europe in a way that was previously unthinkable, paved the way for EU integration, and brought peace and prosperity across the continent," stated outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. With the exception of Finland and Sweden, every enlargement to the East has entailed joining first NATO and then the EU. Ukraine might become a third exception.

While the EU has already opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, NATO is still shying away from doing so. The members of the Alliance agreed in Vilnius last year to waive the Membership Action Plan (MAP) requirement for Ukraine. Twenty-five years ago in Washington, three former Warsaw Pact members ¨C the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland ¨C participated in their first NATO Summit following NATO¡¯s first enlargement to the East. It is in that context that the MAP was launched, to assist other aspirant countries as they prepared to join the Alliance. Since then, it has become the first of a two-step process, the second being the issuing of a formal invitation to join. As NATO celebrated its diamond jubilee, at this Summit, significant progress could, therefore, have been made on issuing a formal invitation to Ukraine. However, despite repeated calls by members such as the Baltic States, Poland, Portugal and Spain, as well as some NATO experts in the US, no official invitation was issued to Kyiv, as there continues to be no consensus among NATO allies for such an endeavour. Ukraine was offered a bridge to membership instead. 

The bridge, which will be ¡°strong, well-lit and¡­short,¡± according to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, consists of a strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) that will contribute to make Ukraine¡¯s path to membership irreversible. The newly agreed aid package includes five elements: 1) the establishment of a NATO command, the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), in Wiesbaden, Germany, and logistical hubs in the Eastern part of the Alliance to take over the coordination and provision of training and security assistance to Ukraine, including both lethal and non-lethal aid, from the US-led Ramstein group; 2) a pledge of long-term security assistance to Ukraine with a minimum baseline of €40 billion within the next year; 3) more immediate support in the form of five additional strategic air defence systems (Patriots) and a dozen of additional tactical systems in the coming months; 4) over 20 bilateral security agreements signed with Ukraine; and 5) deepened military interoperability with Ukraine through a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) to be set up in Poland. In addition, the US, Denmark and the Netherlands announced that the delivery of F-16s (80 according to the Wall Street Journal) to Ukraine is underway and 23 NATO allies plus the EU and Japan, signed the Ukraine Compact, committing to supporting Ukraine for the long haul. ´ó·¢ÌåÓýÔÚÏß_´ó·¢ÌåÓý-Ͷע|¹ÙÍøover, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan revealed at NATO Summit side events that the US will deliver hundreds of additional interceptors to Ukraine over the next year and that NATO intends to appoint a senior representative to Kyiv. 

Indeed, such reassuring language and actions agreed at the Summit represent a step forward and send a clear message to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine¡¯s future is in NATO. However, a number of questions remain, and some considerations are in order.

First, the use of the word ¡°irreversible¡± to describe Ukraine¡¯s path to membership demonstrates that Ukraine joining NATO is indeed ¡°not a question of if, but when,¡± as Stoltenberg had declared on the occasion of the second anniversary of Russia¡¯s invasion. Yet, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO remains distant as Allies still stopped short of producing a clear roadmap towards NATO membership, and simply reaffirmed what already stated in Vilnius, that Ukraine will receive an invitation ¡°when Allies agree and conditions are met¡±.

Second, it is unclear how NSATU will liaise with the EU in coordinating military aid and training. Through its Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), the EU trained over 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers on its soil between November 2022 and May 2024, and is on track to reaching 60,000 by this summer. In addition, under the European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU has provided Ukraine with €11.1 billion worth of military equipment and supplies so far, including lethal weapons, although failing to meet its target of delivering 1 million artillery shells in one year.

Third, the €40 billion worth financial pledge is limited to 2025 and would have to be renewed every year because allies could not agree on the revised (he had originally proposed a €100 billion commitment over the course of five years) multi-year plan the Secretary General had put forward in a previous ministerial meeting. This means that the risks of delays and gaps in military assistance to Ukraine that the package seeks to minimise, particularly in the event of a second Trump presidency, will likely persist. 

Fourth, the security agreements are non-binding documents and do not require legislative ratification, as such providing Ukraine with very weak assurances that are nothing like the Article 5 security guarantee. In the absence of Congressional ratification, for example, a re-elected Donald Trump could simply dismiss any security promise made to Ukraine by his predecessor with the stroke of a pen. If he wins in November, something which became more likely after his failed assassination attempt last weekend, Trump intends to demand peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia even before his inauguration in January 2025, according to the Financial Times. 

Finally, some of the pledges made regarding missile defence systems and fighter jets were already part of previous commitments, and are clearly not enough if upon his return to Kyiv, on Ukrainian Statehood Day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked for 25 Patriots (NATO ordered 1,000 from Raytheon in January) and more F-16s (approximately 216 would be needed on the front lines only, according to a CSIS brief). In addition, as former US Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute highlighted during an interview at the NATO Public Forum, ¡°no effective air defense program¡­focuses solely on defense of the targets site¡­and neglects the attack of the launch sites. The restrictions or caveats that we and others have placed on some of our systems are not justified in legal terms. These are legitimate military targets.¡± He was referring to the fact that the United States, Italy and other NATO allies continue to prohibit Ukraine from using donated systems to launch strikes outside its borders, even after the brutal attack on a children¡¯s hospital in Kyiv ordered by the Kremlin on the eve of the Summit. As Stoltenberg reminded journalists during a joint press conference with President Zelensky before the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting ¡°according to international law, Ukraine, of course has the right to self-defence¡­And the right of self-defence includes also the right to strike legitimate military targets on the territory of the aggressor, Russia¡±. 

This decision not to lift restrictions was a major missed opportunity. Although recognising that Russia ¡°is seeking to fundamentally reconfigure the Euro-Atlantic security architecture¡±, Allies do not seem to have come to a full realisation that NATO¡¯s future and credibility as a deterrent institution are at stake in Ukraine. Work toward Ukraine¡¯s membership should continue, and all members of NATO should commit to giving it weapons at the pace, rate, volume, and capability Ukrainians need without imposing limits on how to use them against legitimate Russian targets. Allies have taken bold steps in rebuilding NATO¡¯s deterrence and defence and deepening partnerships with like-minded democracies. However, these steps concerning Ukraine are equally if not more urgent, and need to be undertaken sooner rather than later if NATO wants to celebrate its centennial in 2049.